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12 Europeanization via Transnational Mobility and Migration

Mobility and migration between countries in Europe are central elements of Europeanization and have played an important role in uniting the continent over the last decades. By being mobile across borders, Europeans have come into contact with each other, generated social bonds and exchanged ideas, thereby creating a dense web of transnational social interaction that contributed to European society-building 'from below' (Mau & Büttner 2009; Deutschmann & Delhey 2015; Kuhn 2015; Recchi et al. 2019a; Heidenreich 2019). At the same time, mobility and migration have also created new fault lines and caused shifts in political landscapes. Brexit, an extreme example of such a rift, even contributed to the partial breakup of the European Union. Regardless of how one weighs these consequences, one thing is clear: mobility and migration matter!

When we speak of *mobility* in this chapter, we mean physical movements of people between countries.[1] *Migration* is a sub-form of such mobility. According to the United Nations, international migration occurs when someone changes their country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason or the legal status in the destination country. Conventionally, this migration is regarded as 'long-term' when the international migrant has lived in the destination country for a period of at least one year (UN 2020). In a nutshell: *migration = mobility + settlement*.

How many people move and migrate between countries in Europe? Figure 12.1 illustrates trends between 2011 and 2018 (i.e., before the Covid-19 pandemic). Panel A shows estimated transnational trips, an indicator for mobility that combines tourism statistics and air traffic data and is thus quite comprehensive (Recchi et al. 2019b). It reveals that both within the EU-28 and Europe at large, the amount of transnational mobility has strongly increased between 2011 and 2016, rising by

1 Research under the "new mobilities paradigm" (Urry 2000) differentiates between physical and virtual mobilities. The latter category includes, e.g., online friendships and phone calls between countries, which allow contact without changing one's location physically. For more details on this form of mobility, which is excluded here, see e.g., Kellerman (2006) and Recchi et al. (2014).

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

Figure 12.1: Trends in mobility and migration flows within Europe over time.
Note: Based on data from the GMP Global Transnational Mobility Dataset (Recchi et al. 2019b) and Eurostat immigration data (2020). Values to and from Cyprus missing in the former dataset; no missing values in the latter.

about 20 per cent in just five years. Panel B, by contrast, illustrates that for yearly migration flows within the EU-28 (based on Eurostat data), there is no clear trend over time. Depending on how migrants are categorized, the overall number of intra-EU-28 immigrants oscillates around 1.3 million (counted by country of birth or citizenship) or 1.8 million (by country of previous residence). This implies that, given a population of 510 million, roughly 0.3 per cent of the EU-28 population migrated to another EU-28 country in 2016. Although comparisons to intranational migration must be treated with caution, it is interesting that this rate is exactly the same as the migration rate from Quebec to the rest of Canada (Fries-Tersch et al. 2017: 43). In the US, by contrast, 1.7 per cent of the US population moved to another US state in 2016 (White 2019). Linguistic barriers may partly explain the lower migration rates in the former two cases.

A comparison of the stated estimates between the two graphs in Figure 12.1 showcases that migration is indeed only a small subset of all mobility: for every migratory move, approximately 500 to 700 transnational trips occurred within the EU-28 in 2016. Our mobility indicator does not take daily cross-border commuting into account – it is hard to measure since it is not registered – rendering this estimate conservative.

Drivers of Mobility and Migration in Europe

Human mobility may be seen as the product of four major factors: politics, technology, the economy, and culture. Each of these macro-factors can either limit or enhance the potential movements of individuals out of their places of birth or residence. Moreover, these factors interact with each other. For instance, political decisions may facilitate innovations in transportation means, while economic development may trigger cultural changes that favor human mobility. In Europe, these underlying factors jointly generated four significant trends affecting mobility and migration post World War II: the deepening and enlargement of the *free movement regime*, the expansion of the *transportation infrastructure*, *economic development*, and the rise of *individual freedom and an ethos of mobility*.

The Free Movement Regime

The expansion of mobility and migration in Europe owes much to the political integration of the continent (Recchi 2015; Geddes et al. 2020). Since the earliest incarnation of the EU – i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)

uniting France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy in 1951 – the focus on a customs-free common market of raw materials was accompanied by a clause allowing workers in the coalmining and steel-making sectors to get jobs in other member states freely. Although the enactment of this policy proved particularly difficult in the following years, the free movement of workers became a flagship principle of the more ambitious European Economic Community in 1957. It was given legal backing in 1968, with the important add-on of non-discrimination of mobile workers vis-à-vis nationals. In the 1970s and 1980s, the right to resettle across the entire supranational space of the Community was disjointed from individuals' employment status, and granted to students, retirees, and the unemployed as well. Eventually, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which turned the European Community into the European Union, generalized the right from "workers to citizens", making it the cornerstone of the newly founded "European citizenship" (Maas 2007). From this point on, every citizen of an EU member state automatically gets European citizenship on top of the national one and can thus enjoy freedom of movement across the Union.

What is commonly called 'freedom of movement' consists, in fact, of three different types of rights:

a. The right to cross the border of other EU member states without a visa and even without a passport (an identity card suffices).
b. The right to settle freely in any EU member state, conditional on having a health insurance and sufficient resources not to be an immediate burden for social assistance in the receiving country.
c. The enjoyment of the same rights as nationals of the receiving country, apart from voting in national elections.

The process by which free movement rights have enlarged their scope and become less conditional over time is dubbed 'deepening' in EU jargon. In parallel, freedom of movement has gone through a 'widening' of the geographical space and populations involved – from 6 up to 28 different sovereign states (until Brexit). Deepening and widening of free movement are, however, not independent of one another. The number of intra-EU migrants stagnated until the early 2000s, when it soared on the eve of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU (Recchi 2015: 49–70). Before the rise of the intra-EU migration flows of the 2000s, the deepening of movers' rights was therefore relatively unproblematic, touching upon a small-scale population. As soon as the stock of (mostly Central and Eastern) European migrants swelled, their access to the same social rights – unemployment, housing, social assistance – as nationals became increasingly contested. While there is evidence that intra-EU migrants did not tap more

welfare benefits than nationals (ECAS 2014), not the least because their younger age profile makes them less likely to need healthcare and retirement pensions, 'welfare chauvinism' gained traction in several receiving countries – notably the UK – and fed into social policies that limited such benefits, in contrast with EU legislation (Bruzelius et al. 2017; Barbulescu and Favell 2019). Even the European Court of Justice, traditionally at the forefront of the deepening of free movement rights, tempered its stance on EU migrants' access to welfare in several controversial judgments (Thym 2017). The free movement of people has not lost its legal prominence in the EU, alongside the other three foundational freedoms of movement of goods, capital, and services, but its symbolic aura looks less uncontroversial now than it used to after the introduction of European citizenship.

Overall, free movement in the EU may be considered a "mobility regime" (Engbersen et al. 2017), because mobility rights are complemented by additional policies that shape and encourage cross-state population movements. A common currency, the EU-wide recognition of educational and professional qualifications, a common template for higher education, research, and student mobility grants (like Erasmus), and, especially, the Schengen agreement on border management are examples of such policies. The latter is perhaps the single most important of these accessory regulations. It takes its name from the town in Luxembourg where it was first discussed by European government representatives in the 1980s. Now an integral part of EU legislation, the Schengen Agreement harmonizes the control of external and internal borders of its signatories (22 out of the 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein).[2] As for external borders, the Agreement provides a framework (the so-called Schengen visa) for third-country nationals wishing to enter the EU and caters for a shared information system for policing access into the Union territory. As regards internal borders, Schengen sets a principle of 'no border control', except in case of external threats (like terrorist attacks or public health emergencies). Much of the image of the EU as a seamless and unitary geographical space is due to this Schengen rule, whose suspension – as during the COVID-19 crisis – is symbolically perceived as a lethal strike against free movement altogether. Such suspensions are unilaterally decided by member states. They therefore retain a last resort control over their borders – an ultimate proof of their primordial sovereignty over national territories.

2 The UK and Ireland opted out of the Schengen agreement from the start. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania are committed to join in at some point.

Transportation Infrastructure

Human mobility is predicated on the development of transportation systems. For instance, some technological improvements in steam-shipping increased the capacity of ocean liners by the end of the 19th century, thus reducing costs and permitting large transatlantic migration flows from Europe to the US, South America, and Australia. Technology, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for long-distance human mobility. Politics plays a major part in the promotion of technological innovation and the deployment of mobility infrastructures. On a regional scale, the success of the EU and its predecessors lies behind two critical political decisions that have greatly eased movement across the continent. The first is the allocation of substantial funding to the development of cross-country land transportation 'corridors'. The second is the liberalization of commercial flight transportation (Mau & Büttner 2009). Let us review both these factors in greater detail.

Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) specifies that the European Commission (EC) is in charge of common policies concerning land transportation. In the first three decades of European integration, member states were reluctant to initiate any coordination on this front. Things started to change in the 1990s, when the EC promoted the development of a Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), with priority projects and generous funding, particularly for the poorest member states. Ever since, European institutions have persistently strived to strengthen transportation infrastructures, with an emphasis on highways in the last decade of the century and high-speed rail later on. Massive investments have been premised on the goal of convergence: transportation from and to less developed regions would help these regions come closer – physically but also economically – to more developed ones. The effort to create a common transportation space has targeted accession countries in the 2000s and, since 2017, even candidate member states are eligible for funding. According to the EC (2020) itself,

> [t]he EU aims to build a modern integrated transport system that strengthens its global competitiveness [. . .] [through] a well-functioning infrastructure that can transport people and goods efficiently, safely, and sustainably. In 2017, the EU's physical infrastructure counts over 217,000 km of railways, 77,000 km of motorways, 42,000 km of inland waterways, 329 key seaports and 325 airports.

Whether – and to what extent – these efforts can counter existing divergences in infrastructure between the richer and the poorer parts of the continent is an open question. Yet, undeniably, the time-space map (also called an 'isochronic map') of Europe has shrunk considerably. Figure 12.2 illustrates the evolution of travel

distances by railways, which is a major part of this story, as it traces the building of new lines and the introduction of faster trains (Spiekermann & Wegener 1994). Does this development create an 'ever closer Union' in mobility terms? Yes, but with marked territorial differences reflecting a 'hub effect': "[O]nly cities that are nodes of the high-speed rail network gain accessibility, while the areas between nodes and those not on the network or at its edges do not" (Puga 2002: 398). Figure 12.2 visualizes this unequal development: some squares on the map shrink faster than others, resulting in a highly distorted time-space grid.

The second significant change in the landscape of transportation infrastructure is the proliferation of flight connections across Europe, which resulted from the spectacular success of low-cost airlines from the 1990s onwards. EU institutions, once more, spearheaded this change. In 1988, 1990 and 1993, the European Commission launched three 'liberalization packages' that dismantled the route and slot monopolies of national airlines (Button 2001). New commercial low-cost carriers invaded the EU-wide market and fares fell across the board. Provincial airports, offering convenient costs to these airlines, widened the number of destinations and improved access to off-the-beaten track destinations – mostly to tourists, but also to workers and business travelers. Demand for airline transportation was further boosted by the EU enlargements, which created a brand-new clientele of Central and Eastern intra-EU migrants. The very existence of cheap East-West airline routes contributed to intra-EU migration embodying short-term and circular-like patterns to a large extent (Gabrielli et al. 2019; Fries-Tersch et al. 2020).

In the 2010s, the liberalization of international flights served as a model for a similarly sharp development in the long-distance bus service sector in continental Europe (and particularly in Germany in 2013 and France in 2015), as well as the progressive deregulation of domestic railway markets. The impact of the liberalization in coach transportation was remarkable: from 2012 to 2015, the bus travel supply in Germany grew from 26 to 220 million kilometers (Grimaldi et al. 2017). Two companies – *Eurolines* and *Flixbus* – have come to dominate the intra-European network routes, becoming particularly popular with young and low-budget passengers.

Economic Development

Mobility comes with a price. The affordability of travel is mostly a function of two factors: the costs of transportation and border-crossing (including visas: Recchi et al. 2020) and the prosperity of would-be movers. From the previous sections, we know that the EU free movement regime has slashed border-crossing costs



Figure 12.2: Time-space maps of railway distances in Europe in 1993 (top) and 2020 (bottom). Source: http://www.spiekermann-wegener.com/mod/time/time_e.htm (accessed 9 June 2020), reproduced with kind permission from Klaus Spiekermann. See the link for an undistorted base map and further details.

and the liberalization of commercial flights has taken down airline price tickets in Europe. Here, we focus on the impact of economic development on the propensity of Europeans to cross borders – either as tourists, economic migrants, business travelers or lifestyle movers.

The first thing to note is that income and wealth do not necessarily have the same impact on short-term movements and longer-term migration. As people grow richer, they may wish to visit other countries. Travel in the form of *tourism*, then, often becomes a consumption good –like fine dining or going to a concert. Figure 12.3 describes this positive relationship between prosperity and mobility across European countries by correlating GDP with the number of outgoing trips (both per capita). The correlation is indeed quite strong (r=.69, p<.001).



Figure 12.3: The relation between GDP per capita and outgoing trips per capita in 2016. Note: Both axes are logarithmic. Based on data from the World Bank and the GMP Global Transnational Mobility Dataset (Recchi et al. 2019b). GDP per capita in USD at PPP (Purchasing Power Parity).

Economic migration, by contrast, is often viewed as an investment decision. In economists' models, the decision to migrate discounts earning differentials – as well as other costs – between the country of origin and the country of destination. In this case, what counts is not economic well-being per se, either at home or at destination, but rather the gap between the two. Migrants may also consider the

dynamic aspect of this gap: A sending country on a recession path may be an incitement to leave (a push factor) as much as a potential receiving country undergoing sustained growth (a pull factor). Indeed, both mechanisms showed up in Europe in the last decades – think, on the one hand of labor migration from Southern Europe during the Euro-crisis, and on the other, the spectacular 'Celtic Tiger' growth of the Irish economy in the early 2000s.

Of course, these are just two ideal types and sometimes the situation is the opposite: short-term *business* and *educational trips* can also serve as investments and *lifestyle migration* (see below) could be interpreted as a form of consumption. The economic development-migration nexus is also complex and the subject of extensive research and debate (for a review with a European focus, see King and Collyer 2016). In Western Europe, economic convergence between countries after the 1970s reduced the incentives to follow the mass migration routes of the 1950s and 1960s – particularly from the Southern part of the continent. In fact, economic development lagged behind in Eastern Europe after WWII, but Socialist regimes barred emigration westbound. The fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent commitment to EU accession created an opportunity for migration from the poorer Central and Eastern European countries, which fully materialized from the turn of the century onward. Eventually, such migration flows affected economic development, feeding back towards subsequent migration waves. Econometric estimates indicate that a 10 per cent increase in the number of immigrants coming from the 2004 and 2007 EU accession states boosted the income per capita in the host countries by 0.30 and 0.55 per cent respectively (Kahanec et al. 2013: 56). The effects of emigration are more problematic for the sending countries, as a ***brain drain*** and the resulting lack of young, educated people affects the depopulated parts of Eastern Europe negatively (Krastev 2020). Yet, since the enlargement, both out-migration and GDP have grown, which suggests that remittances and return migration are likely to have accelerated economic development in Central-Eastern Europe (Buiter & Lubin 2019: 34). Following this trend, in absence of major sociopolitical or economic shocks, economic convergence is likely to attenuate East-West migration in Europe in the future.

Individual Freedom and the Mobility Ethos

As societies become more prosperous and secure, people increasingly value their own self-realization and empowerment (Welzel 2013; Inglehart 2018) – which, from a different theoretical angle, is referred to as 'individualization' (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Among all different forms of freedom, several philosophers – from Hobbes to Pascal and Arendt to Walzer – have highlighted

the primacy of freedom of movement (Blitz 2014). Indeed, peoples' rising appetite for this particular freedom is an ingredient of the expansion of mobility and migration in Europe (and elsewhere). The wish to experience different places and cultures first-hand through mobility is a trope of contemporary culture. As Cresswell (2006: 20) puts it, "mobility is central to what it is to be modern".

Europeans highly value the freedom of cross-national movement that the EU grants them. In spite of mounting anti-immigration sentiments, almost all the Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 2012 and 2019 found that "free movement" ranked on top of the "most positive outcomes of the EU", regularly even more valued than "peace" in the continent.[3] An overwhelming majority of 82.4 per cent of EU citizens appreciated the principle of free movement between 2015 and 2017, and even 72.7 per cent did so in the UK, where Brexit was in fact won on the basis of anti-immigration and anti-EU platforms (Vasilopoulou & Talving 2019). The fact that support for freedom of movement is higher than support for the EU itself indicates that individuals' love of the opportunity to be mobile internationally bolsters EU legitimacy substantially.

This widespread attachment to free movement is also reflected in migration choices. While intra-EU migration has been mostly fueled by labor migration out of the poorest areas of the continent (the East and the South), a small but significant section of the migrating population does not correspond to economic incentives and may be called 'lifestyle migration' (Benson 2016). Especially among Western Europeans, the prevailing motivations to resettle in another EU member state are not strictly income- or labor-related, as upward social mobility is more the exception than the rule (Recchi 2009). In fact, personal relationships and romance drive many Europeans' migration projects (Santacreu et al. 2009; Díez Medrano 2020), as well as the desire to live in a milder climate by the sea or in the countryside (King et al. 2000). In some cases, migration may even be driven by a more deep-seated aspiration of a borderless existence (Favell 2008). For many, transnational mobility is, at the end of the day, a prized freedom that paves the way towards the enjoyment of most other individual liberties.

3 The Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission in all EU member states and additional European countries. The long-term response pattern with respect to what Europeans regard as 'the most positive results of the EU' can be found here: https://bit.ly/2BmyWrf (accessed June 12, 2020).

Sociological Perspectives on Mobility and Migration in Europe

Having discussed background conditions in the preceding section, we now highlight several aspects of mobility and migration in Europe that have been subject to vivid sociological research in the last years, starting with the issue of inequality.

Inequality in Mobility and Migration in Europe

Migration and mobility are distributed very unequally within and between countries in Europe. *Within* countries, a considerable ***class gap*** exists, with the upper social strata (i.e., those with a higher occupational class, better education, etc.) engaged in more cross-border mobility and other transnational activities (Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2016; Salamonska & Recchi 2019). In 2010, for example, one third of upper-class residents of the EU declared that they spend their holidays abroad regularly, as opposed to only 22 per cent of middle-class respondents and 15 per cent of working-class people (Baglioni & Recchi 2013: 54). Class is not the only stratifying force, however: men are more transnationally active than women, urban residents more than people from the countryside, and people with a migration background more than those without (Delhey et al. 2015). One important mechanism that helps create this stratification is ***transnational linguistic capital***: speaking foreign languages makes transnational mobility easier (Gerhards 2012), in particular in a multilingual continent such as Europe. Differences in endowment of economic resources, existing cultural ties to other countries and job-related opportunities for cross-border mobility may be other central explanatory factors.

Between countries, mobility and migration are also distributed unequally, as the two maps in Figures 12.4 and 12.5 reveal. Figure 12.4 shows the intra-EU-28 network of estimated mobility flows in 2016. Whereas the size of the country nodes is proportional to the amount of incoming and outgoing mobility, the node color corresponds to the amount of incoming mobility only, ranging from largest (blue) to smallest (red), with white denoting a medium amount of incoming mobility. Thicker arrows denote larger flows. The mobility network contains a distinctive core of 'blue countries' with a lot of incoming mobility, centered around Germany, the UK, Spain, France, and – to lesser extents – Italy and Poland. Surrounding this core is a set of smaller, peripheral 'red countries' with very little incoming mobility. The European mobility network thus appears highly

unequal and features a clear core-periphery structure. Interestingly, a similar structure is found when exploring Europeans' sense of familiarity with other countries (Savage et al. 2019).



Figure 12.4: Mobility flows in the EU-28, 2016.
Note: Based on the GMP Global Transnational Mobility Dataset (Recchi et al. 2019b). Arrow size corresponds to the number of trips, node size corresponds to the weighted degree and node color corresponds to the weighted indegree, ranging from largest (blue) to smallest (red), with white denoting a medium weighted indegree. Values for Cyprus are missing. Coloring is directly comparable between Figures 12.4 and 12.5, arrow sizes are not.

Figure 12.5 shows a similar representation for migration flows in the EU-28 in 2016. Here, the network appears even more centralized. The UK stands out as *the* main receiver country and Romania as *the* main sender country of migrants. Most major migration flows are one-sided, e.g., from Romania to the UK, Italy, and Spain, or from Poland to the UK and the Netherlands, but not vice versa. An exception is the tie between Spain and the UK, which is meaningful in size in both directions. Windzio et al. (2019) examined – for earlier years, in which Germany stands out as a second central receiver country next to the UK – why the intra-EU migration network takes such a shape and found that national economic performance explains inflows, whereas unemployment rate explains outflows well (see above). Political regulation also seems to play a role, although apparently a weaker one than the economic factors.



Figure 12.5: Migration flows in the EU-28, 2016.
Note: Based on Eurostat data on immigrants by citizenship, retrieved from the KCMD Dynamic Data Hub (https://bluehub.jrc.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/dataset/0026, accessed 4/5/2020). Arrow size corresponds to the number of migrants moving, node size corresponds to the weighted degree and node color corresponds to the weighted indegree, ranging from largest (blue) to smallest (red), with white denoting a medium weighted indegree. Coloring is directly comparable between Figures 12.4 and 12.5, arrow sizes are not.

To achieve further clarity on the amount of inequality in these networks, we may look towards the Gini coefficient for various indicators. While Gini coefficients are often used to measure income inequality, they can also be applied to describe inequality in mobility networks (Delhey et al. 2020; Deutschmann et al. 2021). This measure can range from 0 (denoting a perfectly equal distribution) to 1 (the most unequal distribution possible). In 2016, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of movements across country pairs in the EU-28 was .80 for mobility and .84 for migration.[4] For an assessment of the magnitude of these degrees of inequality, consider that for income inequality the coefficient ranged

4 One could object that a certain inequality is to be expected since the population size varies between countries and larger countries will yield more mobile people. To take this *baseline inequality* into account, we can adjust the flow sizes by the population size of the sender country. When this is done, the inequality shrinks only slightly. With Gini coefficients of .78 for mobility and .79 for migration, it is still very high.

from .24 (Slovakia) to .38 (Bulgaria) in the EU-28 countries in 2016 (Eurostat 2020). Hence, while the inequality of income within countries is already considerable, it is dwarfed by the extreme inequality of mobility and migration in their distribution across country pairs in the EU. This unequal participation in transnational mobility – both within and between countries – can have substantial social implications, as we will see in the following section.

Social Consequences of Mobility and Migration

Why should we care about the unequal distribution of mobility and migration? What are their social consequences? One reason is that mobility to other countries generates ***transnational human capital***, a new marker of distinction and a resource that is increasingly in demand in labor markets today (Gerhards et al. 2017). Experience abroad is seen as positive as it signals intercultural competence – to start with, improved foreign language proficiency. Thus, participating in mobility and migration across borders can influence opportunities in life and plays a significant role in (re-)producing social stratification.

Going abroad can also have positive consequences for one's social position when the move is permanent, i.e., when one migrates. This phenomenon is called ***social spiralism***: by moving from provincial places in Europe's periphery to urban centers in the core, migrants can potentially "spiral [. . .] up through society by taking a detour away from their place of origin" (Favell & Recchi 2011: 53). Thus, moving abroad spatially may boost upward social mobility. However, this transition is far from easy. Empirically, it is only achieved by a minority of migrants and often only after a difficult transition phase that may even entail temporary downward mobility.

Another consequence of mobility and migration is the creation of a *transnational sense of community*. By moving across borders, people from different nationalities come into contact. According to the ***contact hypothesis*** (sometimes also called *intergroup contact theory* or *transactionalist theory*), this increased interaction leads to a we-feeling as a former out-group becomes part of a new common in-group. A shared identity develops, possibly leading to increased solidarity, trust, and attachment to other countries (Deutsch et al. 1957). Several empirical studies support this hypothesis (Mau et al. 2008; Kuhn 2011; Recchi 2015; Deutschmann et al. 2018).

Others have hypothesized – in stark contrast to the above arguments – that mobility and migration across borders can lead to emerging societal conflicts, a position we may call the ***conflict hypothesis***. This idea is particularly pronounced for permanent, (allegedly) poverty-driven moves. As already mentioned

above, migration from Central and Eastern Europe to the UK was a prominent point of contention that drove the Brexit campaign (Sudarshan 2017), and in Western Europe at large it has contributed to the perception of immigration as an economic threat (Jeannet 2020). Social conflicts can also result from other forms of mobility such as tourism. Examples include citizen protests as a reaction to congested housing markets and rising rents due to Airbnb and the negative impact of ***overtourism*** (Clancy 2020; Delhey et al. 2020).

Thus, there appears to be a paradoxical situation in which mobility and migration have both unifying (growing sense of community) and dividing (new conflicts) effects. How can this seemingly intractable paradox be resolved? First, society is complex, and it is well possible that some social groups welcome increasing exchange across borders and perceive it as enriching in both economic and cultural terms, whereas other groups see it negatively, be it for fear of labor market competition or threatened cultural identities. The labels 'cosmopolitan' and 'local' (Merton 1949; Recchi 2005; Helbling & Teney 2015) have been used to describe these two archetypes. Transnational mobility and migration can thus lead to a sense of community in some social milieus and to resentment and conflict in others.

Second, it is important to consider that, following a counterintuitive perspective that was first introduced by Simmel (1904), both an increased sense of community and new social conflicts can be understood as indicators of social integration. While it can often feel disintegrative for the individuals involved, a conflict also represents a form of social interaction – and thus a sociation (i.e., 'society-making') force in Simmel's terms. A well-functioning society is one in which there is room for some conflict. For Europe, the social consequences of intra-European mobility and migration could thus be regarded as integrative in this sense, i.e., as signs of *horizontal Europeanization*, regardless of whether they are directly unifying or conflictive. This theoretical argument is visualized in Figure 12.6. Following a similar logic, El-Mafaalani (2018) has recently argued that it is precisely when the integration of migrants is successful that more (not less!) social conflicts occur, a situation he calls the ***integration paradox***.

Looking beyond Europe to Learn about Europe

The European networks of mobility and migration are actually not closed systems as depicted in Figures 12.4 and 12.5. In reality, Europeans also move to other parts of the world and people from all over the planet come to Europe (Mau & Büttner 2009). Furthermore, people are also transnationally mobile in other world regions.



Figure 12.6: Seemingly paradoxical consequences of mobility and migration.

The actual density or sparseness of intra-European networks of transnational mobility and migration may only be determined – one may argue – by comparing it to similar networks in other world regions, i.e., via an external benchmark, in line with a ***comparative sociology of regional integration*** (Deutschmann 2021). In other words, we need to look beyond Europe to learn about Europe.

Doing so reveals, on the one hand, that more transnational mobility takes place within Europe than within other world regions (Recchi et al. 2019b). On the other hand, however, the *density* (i.e., the share of country pairs that feature a substantial mobility flow) is not low but also not exceptionally high in the European mobility network compared to other world regions. This has to do with the high inequality observed above: while a few country pairs in Europe feature extremely large flows of mobility and migration, most see only small flows (see the many thin red ties in Figures 12.4 and 12.5). Hence, this highly unequal participation in cross-border mobility and migration diminishes the overall density, or *regionalism*, of interaction in Europe compared to other world regions (Deutschmann 2021).

Another important factor is that Europe is more globally integrated through inter-continental ties of mobility and migration than other world regions. Thus, whereas some world regions (e.g., Latin America) are only strongly connected internally, Europe is relatively well-connected internally *and* globally. In other words, it is *both Europeanized and globalized*, which mitigates its regionalism in relative terms (Deutschmann 2019). This is also visible in longitudinal comparative analyses of migration stocks that show that Europeans increasingly tend to stay in Europe when moving abroad: whereas only 40 per cent of emigrants from European countries moved within Europe (as opposed to out of Europe) in 1960, this share increased to 60 per cent in 2017. At the same time, migrants from outside Europe as a share of all migrants moving into European

countries also increased from 40 per cent in 1960 to 60 per cent in 2017. These two trends taken together again suggest a double process of *Europeanization from within* and *globalization from outside* (Delhey et al. 2019, 2020).

Conclusion

Modern societies are not demographically 'closed containers'. Rather, commodities, messages, and, not least, people constantly move between countries around the planet. In Europe, mobility and migration across borders are a central aspect of horizontal Europeanization (Mau & Mewes 2012). This chapter provided an overview of the central drivers behind this process and gave insights into some sociological perspectives on the topic. There are two final aspects that we wish to highlight in this conclusion.

The first is the interplay of migration and short-term mobility: rather than being separate phenomena, increased migration can trigger increased short-term movement through circular mobility of migrants. Typically, migrants do not move into a receiving society once and for all, but rather tend to move back and forth, thereby creating 'transnational social spaces', a view that is highlighted in transnational migration research (Waldinger 2015). At the same time, short-term mobility may usher in prospects of settlement and thus translate into migration. Second, there can be complex interplays of factors boosting and constraining mobility and migration. A good example is the global Covid-19 pandemic: a health crisis led to political decisions to block (cross-border) mobility, which engendered an economic crisis, which, in turn, may lead to new pressures in favor of migration. Another example is the climate crisis: transnational mobility is still emission-intensive today and thus a major contributor to the looming climate catastrophe, which, in turn, may globally force one billion people to migrate (Spratt & Dunlop 2019). These complex entanglements will have to be studied closely in the coming years, in Europe and beyond.

Didactical Section

Key Learning Points

- Mobility and migration are central mechanisms by which Europeans are brought into contact with each other, thus facilitating horizontal Europeanization.
- Mobility and migration are distributed very unequally between social strata within societies and extremely unequally across country pairs in Europe.
- Mobility and migration can lead to a sense of community and generate new social conflicts, both of which can be seen as contributing to social integration in Europe.

Glossary

Brain drain: negative consequences of massive emigration due to the lack of human capital in the sending country.

Class gap: the higher social strata are more transnationally mobile than the lower ones (e.g., Fligstein 2008; Delhey et al. 2015).

Comparative Sociology of Regional Integration: comparing mobility and migration patterns across world regions can lead to new insights through external benchmarks (Deutschmann 2019, 2021).

Contact hypothesis: intergroup contact leads to a sense of community (Allport 1954); mobility and migration between countries lead to a transnational sense of community (Deutsch et al. 1957).

Conflict hypothesis: intergroup contact (e.g., through mobility and migration) leads to social conflicts (Campbell 1965).

Integration paradox: the successful integration of migrants into a host society leads to new social conflicts (El-Mafaalani 2018).

Overtourism: too much tourism has negative social, economic, and ecological consequences for the hosting environment (e.g., Clancy 2020).

Social spiralism: potential upward social mobility achievable through (transnational) spatial mobility (Favell & Recchi 2011).

Transnational linguistic capital: skills and resources linked to speaking foreign languages (Gerhards 2012).

Transnational human capital: skills and resources derived from experiences abroad (Gerhards et al. 2017).

Further Readings

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Additional Web-Sources

Global Mobilities Project: The GMP at the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute (EUI) collects data on transnational mobility and the structural factors that form it. The Global Transnational Mobility Dataset, which was used in this chapter, can be downloaded for free to explore mobility flows within Europe and beyond: http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/globalmobilities

KCMD Dynamic Data Hub: This website, created by the European Commission's Knowledge Centre on Migration and Democracy, allows you to explore various mobility and migration datasets (including the ones used in this chapter) on an interactive world map. The data can be downloaded by pressing the 'D' key on your keyboard: https://bit.ly/2LdjNwK

Network Europe: This website, built to accompany the book *Netzwerk Europa* (Delhey et al. 2020) allows you to explore visually the development of migration, student exchange, and tourism flows as well as international phone calls in Europe in their development over time: www.network-europe.eu

Questions for Discussion

1. Are you from Europe and have you been to other European countries? If yes, do you feel these stays abroad have made you feel more 'European'?

2. During the Covid-19 pandemic, international mobility decreased a lot as many borders were closed. How do you think this may have affected processes of Europeanization?
3. What do you think: Is mobility been countries primarily a path to peaceful integration or rather a source of new social conflicts?

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